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 conditions contributed to my judgment, I assume that
 others will judge as I do. I do not ask them whet er
 they agree with me, I demand that they agree. How can
 I do this? As far as I can see, I can either legislate for
 my contemporaries or try to persuade them. I would
 argue that in the German context, the legislation
 betrays an authoritarian streak. Cavell suggests that
 in the American context, the effort at persuasion is
 preaching.
 Legislating or preaching-the bifurcation is
 grounded on Schiller's advice to the artist in the ninth
 letter: "Lebe mit deinem Jahrhundert, aber sei nicht
 sein Gesch6pf; leiste deinen Zeitgenossen, aber, was
 sie bediirfen, nicht, was sie loben" [Live in your
 century, but do not be its creature; yet give your
 contemporaries what they need, not what they
 praise]. This demand presupposes that the artist (and
 by extension, the critic or aesthetician) knows what
 his or her audience needs without asking for its opin-
 ion. The authoritarian streak in this demand is unmis-
 takable. If the reader wishes to connect the legislating
 lineage with a name, I would suggest Theodor
 Adorno. He understood Schiller's advice as a license
 to legislate for his audiences what they ought to
 admit as art and what they ought to exclude as bey-
 ond the pale.
 Schiller's program in the ninth letter was more
 modest. He wanted his audience to read Goethe
 rather than Klopstock. Such an effort at persuasion is
 surely legitimate. Even if we take a further step and
 try to persuade our audience by preaching a sermon
 on behalf of what we consider good art, it is unlikely
 that we will do harm. Yet, legislators and preachers
 are both mistaken if they believe they are completely
 harmless. The eastern European and Russian experi-
 ence during the last century provides examples of
 compelling observance of legislation in aesthetic
 matters. Although this example counts as an abuse of
 legislating, and it may not reoccur, preaching on
 behalf of an aesthetic or moral conviction contains
 another danger. We must become aware of that
 danger.
 Preachers address their message to both the right-
 eous and the unrighteous. Neither the pastor nor the
 flock need to change their way of life on hearing the
 sermon. It is indeed of crucial importance that the
 preacher (just as the critic or aesthetician) cannot
 enforce his or her views, he or she is merely con-
 cerned with bringing sinners to subject themselves to
 Divine law. If they decline to do so, that is their loss,
 and that is the end of the matter. The danger arises
 when some members of the flock take the sermon
 seriously to the point that they want to remove the
 black sheep from the flock so that these nonconform-
 ists cease to offend the righteous. We have a name
 for people who contemplate such actions, we call
 them sectarians. The unwarranted sectarianism of
 some listeners of the sermon is the danger that comes
 with preaching on behalf of convictions.
 The lack of an authoritarian streak in Cavell's
 writings convinces me that the Kantian tradition of
 criticism can dispense with elitism and that preaching
 is preferable to legislating. Film was a characteristic
 art of his time, so he showed its intellectual content.
 Does the movies' intelle tual content keep them from
 being ideologically tainted products of the entertain-
 ment industry? Not at all. Adorno was mistaken if he
 thought that the ideological taint vitiated the movies'
 intellectual content. Cavell is mistaken if he believes
 the movies' intellectual content removes their ideo-
 logical taint.
 Sex and love are admissible only within the bonds
 of marriage-this is the dominant ideology adhered
 to in these movies, even if occasionally some
 fictional characters violate the expected standards of
 behavior. Cavell believes that in these films marriage
 is an allegory of what philosophers have called
 friendship. It may be the case that in America
 marriage has taken the place of what in Europe is
 called friendship. Still, marriage and friendship are
 incomparable, at least in certain respects. Marriage
 and divorce require the contributions of authorities
 spiritual or temporal. Marriage is considered a sacra-
 ment or an institution. There is nothing analogous in
 the context of friendship.
 It would be difficult to overestimate Cavell's con-
 tribution to our field. Readers critical of his style-
 pretentiousness is the usual charge-have not consid-
 ered sufficiently the importance of his insights. In a
 critical vein, I would submit that more attention be
 paid to the ideological content of the movies Cavell
 discusses, and that the occasional abuse of preaching
 ab ut moral matters by sectarians be taken seriously.
 But this does not diminish my admiration for this
 book.
 P.S.: The index is deficient.
 LAURENT STERN
 Department of Philosophy
 Rutgers University
 HILL, R. KEVIN. Nietzsche's Critiques: The Kantian
 Foundations of His Thought. Oxford: Clarendon
 Press, 2003, xvi+242 pp., $45.00 cloth.
 This book presents an original and systematic study
 of Immanuel Kant's influence on Friedrich Nietzsche
 and is the first sustained examination of Nietzsche's
 debt to Kant. As such, it addresses a need hitherto
 neglected by the vast secondary literature on
 Nietzsche, to which it is a valuable addition. Kevin
 Hill's overarching thesis is that Nietzsche is a sys-
 tematic philosopher who knew all three of Kant's
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 Critiques more intimately than is commonly thought.
 Hill argues that Nietzsche can be properly understood
 only in relation to Kant. For throughout the course of
 his philosophical career, Hill contends, Nietzsche
 grappled with many of the central themes of Kant's
 critical project, generating many of his own posi-
 tions, on the one hand, out of a negation of Kant's,
 and, on the other, as an extension or development of
 Kantian ideas. Overall, this contrast with Kant is a
 fruitful and meaningful one, which effectively brings
 out many fundamental features of Nietzsche's
 thought.
 In the opening chapter, Hill considers the nature of
 Nietzsche's knowledge of Kant by briefly examining
 three of the nineteenth-century interpretations of
 Kant that Nietzsche is known to have read, namely,
 those of Kuno Fischer, Friedrich Lange, and Arthur
 Schopenhauer. Hill underplays the importance of
 Schopenhauer in an attempt to diffuse the common
 view that Nietzsche's grasp of Kant derived entirely
 from a reading of Schopenhauer's arguably superfi-
 cial interpretation of Kant. This claim is central to
 Hill's whole enterprise, since if Nietzsche's know-
 ledge of Kant was derived exclusively from
 Schopenhauer, then this would render both his debt
 to and his criticisms of Kant unworthy of further
 consideration. However, Hill argues persuasively not
 only that Nietzsche's knowledge of Kant was not
 confined to Schopenhauer, but also that it was not
 restricted to secondary sources: Hill adduces substan-
 tial evidence that Nietzsche had direct acquaintance
 with all three of Kant's Critiques, as well as several
 more minor works of the Kantian corpus.
 Chapters 2 and 3 focus on Nietzsche's early
 encounter with the Critique of Judgment. Hill argues
 that Nietzsche's claims about metaphysics and epis-
 temology in The Birth of Tragedy and the posthu-
 mously published essay "On Truth and Lie in an
 Extra-Moral Sense" can be made sense of only within
 the context of his appropriation of the third Critique.
 As a preliminary to this, Hill offers a new interpreta-
 tion of this perplexing Kantian text, which focuses on
 the centrality of reflective judgment in the work. Hill
 defends Kant's claim that aesthetic and teleological
 judgments are both reflective, as opposed to determin-
 ative, in the sense that they exemplify ways that the
 subject is caused, by the constitution of the mind, to
 think of the object of experience "as if' designed.
 Hill then argues that Kant's conception of reflective
 judgment had a significant influence on Nietzsche's
 early views on teleology and aesthetics. Hill contends
 that Nietzsche's early published and unpublished
 writings, including The Birth of Tragedy, are more
 indebted to Kant's metaphysics and conception of the
 supersensible than they are to Schopenhauer's
 metaphysics of the will. Though Nietzsche retained a
 conception of the noumenal, Hill argues that he
 rejected Schopenhauerian determinative judgments
 about noumena in favor of Kantian reflectiv  judg-
 ments, which, though intersubjectiv ly acceptable,
 are nonetheless not objectively valid.
 Chapters 4, 5, and 6 deal with Kant's influence o
 Nietzsche's mature critiques of metaphysics and
 epistemology. Hill argues that Nietzsche's naturalism
 is best understood as a rejection of the transcendental
 ideality f space and time, as Kant argues for it in the
 "Transcendental Aestheti ." As Hill notes, this
 generates a puzzle about how to understand the rela-
 tionship between appearances and reality, given
 Nietzsche's continuing adherence to the Kantian
 thesis that the mind imposes order on its experiences,
 on the one hand, and his rejection of things-in-
 themselves, on the other. Hill attempts to resolve this
 seeming tension by claiming that the contrast
 between appearance and reality in Nietzsche is not
 between the illusory world of experience and ulti-
 mate metaphysical reality. The contrast is between
 the world we directly experience by virtue of our
 cognitive and perceptual apparatus and the world as
 posited by our best empirical theories. One would
 have liked to see Hill do more here to underline the
 obvious and fundamental differences between the
 two philosophers' approaches to metaphysics and
 epistemology. Although it is true that some of
 Nietzsche's most important ideas in these areas are to
 be viewed as outgrowths of a variety of specific meta-
 physical and epistemological claims made in Kant's
 Critiques, Nietzsche's metaphysico-epistemological
 views invariably serve his own ethical or evaluative
 agenda, rather than, as with Kant, a purely analytic or
 epistemological one.
 The final chapter of the book considers the various
 ways the three treatises of the Genealogy confront
 particular aspects of Kant's practical philosophy and
 related works about Kantian ethics. Hill claims that
 each treatise derives from an encounter with a differ-
 ent aspect of Kant's moral philosophy: rational
 reconstruction of moral intuitions, the analysis of
 agency, and the practical postulates. In respect of the
 first of these, Hill argues that the first treatise traces
 the moral intuitions Kant relies on to slave morality
 and its social and psychological conditions, thus
 debunking their claim to transcendental legitimacy.
 One problem for Hill's reading here is that it is
 Schopenhauer's ethics to which Nietzsche explicitly
 opposes himself in the Genealogy (see, for example,
 On the Genealogy of Morality, Preface: 5). But in
 general, the first treatise presents a genealogical anal-
 ysis of Christian morality and its secular forms, of
 which Kant is just one among many proponents. Hill
 goes on to claim that the second essay appropriates
 key aspects of Kant's model of agency, and that the
 third treatise traces the phenomenal/noumenal
 distinction to the ascetic ideal, which is said to have
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 its roots in a deep hostility to natural human existence
 and the world at large. But again, this reading seems
 highly tendentious, since the phenomenal/noumenal
 distinction is not a  exclusively Kantian idea,
 but rather has an ancestry that reaches back through
 Christianity, Plato, and beyond. In addition, Hill
 argues that Nietzsche's immoralism is best
 understood as a rejection of the universalistic or
 agent-neutral dimension of Kant's analysis of rule-
 governed action. This seems fair up to a point, but
 ethical universalism is also one of the defining char-
 acteristics of Christian morality, which once more
 seems to be the more obvious target of Nietzsche's
 critique.
 Periodically, then, the reader is left feeling that
 Hill has overstated his central thesis concerning the
 nature and extent of Kant's influence on Nietzsche,
 and that the orthodox view that Nietzsche was
 centrally preoccupied by Schopenhauer is closer to
 the truth. As Hill notes, there are 381 references to
 Kant/Kantian in the Colli-Montinari edition, but this
 number is easily surpassed by references to Schopen-
 hauer. All in all, however, Nietzsche's Critiques is a
 volume that will be of great value to all serious
 scholars and students with interests in either of these
 philosophical titans, or in the history of ideas generally.
 DANIEL CAME
 Department of Philosophy
 University of Oxford
 SPITZER, MICHAEL. Metaphor and Musical Thought.
 University of Chicago Press, 2004, x+380 pp., 1
 color+6 b&w illus., $60.00 cloth.
 Michael Spitzer's book begins with the bold claim
 that all discourse about music is inevitably metaphor-
 ical. Metaphors are needed to assist us in understand-
 ing something so abstract. (As used by Spitzer, the
 concept of metaphor is a portmanteau that includes
 analogy, simile, allegory, metonymy, and a variety of
 other tropes.) These metaphors are said to shape our
 experience of music and determine what we hear it
 as. As bold as his initial claim may seem, Spitzer
 makes a bolder one: music can, and often does,
 employ metaphors. This ambitious book is designed
 to be "nothing less than a general theory of musical
 discourse" (p. 93). It is a theory concerning both dis-
 course about music and discourse by means of music.
 In developing this theory, Spitzer displays an ency-
 clopedic knowledge of writing about music and a
 deep sensitivity to music.
 This book is divided into two parts. Part I is a
 theoretical exploration of the concept of metaphor
 and its application to music. Spitzer draws on a wide
 range of writers on metaphor. These range from
 Anglo-American theorists such as George Lakoff and
 Mark Johnson to continental thinkers. The conti-
 ental thinkers Spitzer favors belong to the herme-
 neutic tradition. Paul Ricoeur is a major inspiration,
 while Jacques Derrida comes i  for periodic
 criticism. Roger Scruton is credited with being "the
 writer who, more than any other, put musical meta-
 phor on the map." Spitzer quotes Scruton as speak-
 ing, in his Aesthetics of Music, of the "indispensable
 metaphor" we use in approaching music: it is a
 "living, breathing, moving organism" (p. 83).
 Although Scruton is the starting point, Spitzer
 believes that a variety of metaphors can be used to
 approach music. A primary aim of the book is to
 identify these metaphors and show how they affect
 the experience of music.
 A major challenge faced in Part I is showing that
 apparently literal talk about music is metaphorical.
 In particular, the analyses of music by Heinrich
 Schenker and his disciples seems to be completely
 literal. Spitzer maintains that their writing about
 music is thoroughly metaphorical. He has two argu-
 ments. Both start from the claim that metaphor
 involves a comparison between distinct domains. The
 first argument, which I do not quite follow, leads to
 the conclusion that Schenkerian analysis is meta-
 phorical because "counterpoint and meter are used
 metaphorically; the original, basic-level categories
 are mapped onto the imaginary domain of a theoretical
 abstraction" (p. 30). The second argument turns on
 the claim that Schenkerian writing constantly
 involves the use of metaphors of growth and motion
 as ways of understanding musical forms. Schenkerian
 metaphors, like others, influence what listeners hear
 music as.
 The suggestion that music itself is metaphorical is
 introduced in the second and third chapters of Part I.
 S itzer states that "metaphor is intrinsic to musical
 discourse throughout the common-practice period"
 (p. 112). (Here 'musical discourse' refers not to dis-
 course about music, but discourse by means of
 music.) Spitzer illustrates his position with examples
 from Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven. In discussing
 measures 18-20 of the St. John Passion, for example,
 S itzer notes: "By reworking the opening instrumen-
 tal ritornello so as to include the choir, Bach embod-
 ies the music with human voices. Second, this
 oment enacts an incarnation of the figure of Christ,
 who steps forth into the drama for the first time. The
 descending C minor triad is Christ's theme in the
 entire Passion" (p. 113).
 Part II, much longer than the first part, begins with
 an extended conceit, somewhat in the style of Derrida,
 on the use of the sunflower and the heliotrope as
 metaphors. This florilegium is supposed to reveal the
 structure of this part of the book. Even if readers find
 the conceit unhelpful, the structure of this part of the
glo-American theorists uch as George Lakoff nd
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